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THE WRONG DECISION AT THE WRONG
TIME: UTAH V. STRIEFF IN THE ERA
OF AGGRESSIVE POLICING
Julian A. Cook III*

“This Court has given officers an array of instruments to probe and
examine you. When we condone officers’ use of these devices without
adequate cause, we give them reason to target pedestrians in an arbitrary
manner. We also risk treating members of our communities as secondclass citizens.”
—Justice Sotomayor1

O

N June 20, 2016, the United States Supreme Court decided Utah
v. Strieff,2 a case that has received little public attention yet carries enormous implications. The case centered upon the exclusionary rule, which, as a general matter, provides that derivative evidence
seized in violation of an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights is inadmissible at that individual’s criminal trial.3 Shortly after leaving a house
that an officer suspected housed illegal narcotics activity, Strieff was
stopped by an officer in the absence of reasonable suspicion.4 Moments
later, the officer contacted police dispatch, who informed him that Strieff
had an outstanding arrest warrant.5 Thereafter, Strieff was arrested, and a
search of his person uncovered “methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia.”6 Given the unconstitutionality of his initial detention, Strieff argued that the exclusionary rule mandated the exclusion of evidence
seized from his person.7
By a five to three vote, the Court rejected Strieff’s contention.8 It relied
upon an exception to the exclusionary rule, the attenuation doctrine, and
* J. Alton Hosch Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. I would
like to extend my thanks to Professors R. Michael Cassidy, Cynthia Lee, and Kim FordeMazrui for their terrific comments and recommendations. I would also like to thank
Hannah Heltzel, Nicholas Nunn, Jonathan Weeks, and Lauren Woodyard for their excellent research assistance. In addition, I would like to thank the SMU Law Review for their
professionalism and valuable editorial assistance. Finally, I would like to thank Thomas
Striepe for his outstanding support in the preparation of this article.
1. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2069 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
2. Id. at 2056 (majority opinion).
3. Id. at 2061.
4. Id. at 2059–60.
5. Id. at 2060.
6. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2060.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 2064.
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upheld the admission of the evidence that was recovered incident to
Strieff’s arrest.9 Despite the unconstitutionality of Strieff’s initial detainment,10 the Court reasoned that the outstanding warrant constituted an
intervening event—an attenuating circumstance—that sufficiently dissipated the taint from the initial illegality.11
Only fifteen days after the decision in Strieff, the first of two prominent
events occurred that, again, thrust the issue of aggressive policing back in
the national spotlight. On July 5, 2016, Alton Sterling was shot and killed
outside of a nearby convenience store by two officers employed by the
Baton Rouge, Louisiana police department.12 Sterling was approached by
the officers after they had received a report that an individual wearing a
red shirt “had pointed a gun at someone.”13 Sterling routinely sold CDs
outside of the convenience store and was at this location at the time of
the confrontation with the police.14 Videos of the confrontation show the
officers on top of Sterling at the time of the shooting.15 The police reportedly removed a gun from Sterling’s person at some point during the encounter.16 The owner of the convenience store stated that he had known
Sterling for many years, that he was unaware of any previous violent encounters between Sterling and other individuals, that he did not know
what precipitated the arrival of the police on July 5, and that the police
were aggressive towards Sterling from the outset.17
The following day, on July 6, 2016, an officer shot and killed Philando
Castile, who was seated in his car after being pulled over for having a
broken taillight in Falcon Heights, Minnesota, which is located near St.
Paul.18 A coroner’s report indicated that Castile had been shot multiple
9. Id.
10. Id. at 2062–63.
11. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2062–63.
12. Radley Balko, Alton Sterling’s Death Appears To Be Another Police Shooting That
Was Both Legal and Preventable, WASH. POST (July 6, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/the-watch/wp/2016/07/06/alton-sterlings-death-appears-to-be-another-policeshooting-that-was-both-legal-and-preventable/?utm_term=.265cad20048f [https://perma.cc/
ES8L-4C4Z]; Joshua Berlinger, Alton Sterling Shooting: Homeless Man Made 911 Call,
Source Says, CNN (July 8, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/07/us/baton-rouge-altonsterling-shooting/ [https://perma.cc/ZVH5-APAX]; Richard Fausset, Alton Sterling Shooting in Baton Rouge Prompts Justice Dept. Investigation, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2016), http://
www.nytimes.com/2016/07/06/us/alton-sterling-baton-rouge-shooting.html?_r=1 [https://per
ma.cc/C6V2-852F].
13. Balko, supra note 12.
14. Berlinger, supra note 12.
15. Balko, supra note 12; Berlinger, supra note 12; Fausset, supra note 12.
16. Balko, supra note 12; Berlinger, supra note 12; Fausset, supra note 12.
17. Balko, supra note 12.
18. Camila Domonoske, Minnesota Gov. Calls Traffic Stop “Absolutely Appalling at
All Levels”, NPR (July 7, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/07/07/48506
6807/police-stop-ends-in-black-mans-death-aftermath-is-livestreamed-online-video [https://
perma.cc/T7HY-LGF9]; Matt Furber, After Philando Castile’s Killing, Obama Calls Police
Shootings “an American Issue”, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/
07/08/us/philando-castile-falcon-heights-shooting.html [https://perma.cc/LC9Y-S8GP];
Sharan LaFraniere, Philando Castile Was Pulled Over 49 Times in 13 Years, Often for Minor Infractions, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/17/us/beforephilando-castiles-fatal-encounter-a-costly-trail-of-minor-traffic-stops.html [https://perma
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times.19 Diamond Reynolds, who identified herself as Castile’s girlfriend,
was a passenger in the car and had her four-year-old daughter in the
backseat. Reynolds was recording the incident and the events after the
shooting and “was streaming it live on Facebook.”20 The footage showed
a bleeding Castile after he had been shot in the front driver’s seat and the
officer continuing to point his gun in the direction of the occupants of the
vehicle.21 Reynolds stated that prior to the shooting, Castile had informed the officer that he had a gun, and that Castile, pursuant to the
officer’s request, was retrieving his driver’s license and registration when
the officer began firing his weapon.22
These events have dissimilar underlying facts—Strieff involved a white
defendant who was illegally stopped for narcotics possession, and Sterling
and Castile involved black individuals who were killed by police officers
under questionable circumstances—but they are anything but distinct.23
Dean Erwin Chemerinsky aptly noted that “Utah v. Strieff was decided at
a time of great social tension about policing, especially in minority communities.”24 Expounding upon Chemerinsky’s observation, this article
will demonstrate that these events are connected by much more than timing. It will discuss how Strieff and the Sterling and Castile incidents are
linked by decades of Supreme Court jurisprudence. It will describe how
since before the close of the Warren Court in 1969 the Supreme Court
began a process of expanding police powers, restricting individual Fourth
Amendment safeguards, and encouraging officers to engage in unconstitutional investigative practices. The article will proceed with a particularized focus upon the Supreme Court’s exclusionary rule and standing
jurisprudence, and its discussion of Strieff will take place in this broader
.cc/X78A-EKPT]; Eliott C. McLaughlin, Woman Streams Aftermath of Fatal Officer-Involved Shooting, CNN (July 8, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/07/us/falcon-heightsshooting-minnesota/ [https://perma.cc/UC4T-84DP].
19. Furber, supra note 18.
20. Domonoske, supra note 18; Furber, supra note 18; McLaughlin, supra note 18.
21. Furber, supra note 18.
22. Domonoske, supra note 18; Fuber, supra note 18; LaFraniere, supra note 18; McLaughlin, supra note 18; Mitch Smith, Philando Castile’s Last Night: Tacos and Laughs,
Then a Drive, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/13/us/philandocastile-minnesota-police-shooting.html [https://perma.cc/VN7S-PCJC].
23. The Sterling and Castile shootings prompted a statement from President Barack
Obama, who commented that the nation “should be troubled by these shootings because
these are not isolated incidents” and that “[t]hey’re symptomatic of a broader set racial
disparities that exist in our criminal justice system.” David Nakamura, Obama: “All Americans Should Be Deeply Troubled” by Recent Police Shootings, WASH. POST (July 7, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/07/07/obama-all-americansshould-be-deeply-troubled-by-recent-police-shootings/?utm_term=.3d2daab51a21 [https://
perma.cc/WDJ5-H6QV]. The impact of the shootings seemingly precipitated retaliatory
and deadly shootings of five police officers in Dallas, Texas, and three in Baton Rouge,
Louisiana. Manny Fernandez, Five Dallas Officers Were Killed as Payback, Police Chief
Says, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/09/us/dallas-police-shooting.html [https://perma.cc/UYC6-KSFM].
24. Erwin Chemerinsky, Has the Supreme Court Dealt a Blow to the Fourth Amendment?, ABA J. (Aug. 2, 2016), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chemerinsky_has_
the_supreme_court_dealt_a_blow_to_the_fourth_amendment [https://perma.cc/4JFAGAK4].
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context. It will explain how the decline of the exclusionary rule and the
attendant standing doctrine over the course of several decades have
helped foster a culture of aggressive police practices. It will illuminate
how the Court’s steady expansion of police investigative authority, coupled with its increasing willingness to forgive constitutional missteps by
the government, have encouraged the police to engage in unconstitutional practices and to test the outer limits of acceptable police behaviors.
When viewed in this context, Strieff is the latest in a series of Supreme
Court cases that have implicitly encouraged aggressive police conduct.25
Strieff is a most unfortunate and perilous expansion of the attenuated
circumstances doctrine. Though accurately cast as a case that encourages
unconstitutional detentions by the police,26 a more apt description of
Streiff is that it promotes physical contact with individuals by the police
without just cause. In contrast to the Court’s good faith exception and
attenuated circumstances cases that preceded it, Strieff breaks disturbing
new ground; it creates an incentive for officers to get within close proximity of individuals, to detain them unconstitutionally, and to risk unnecessary physical confrontation. At a time when officer aggression has ignited
national controversy and outrage in communities (particularly minority)
from coast to coast, Strieff delivers the wrong message at the wrong time.
Parts I and II of this article will respectively discuss the Supreme
Court’s standing doctrine and exclusionary rule jurisprudence from the
Warren Court to the present. This review will detail the meaningful pruning of the exclusionary penalty, the substantial curtailment of the standing doctrine, and will explain why these pronouncements have had an
adverse impact upon police culture and practices. Part III will propose a
25. Many academics and other commentators have been highly critical of Strieff. See
Lawrence Friedman, Faculty Blog: Utah v. Strieff: The Court Reminds Us That Constitutional Privacy is Essentially Meaningless, NEW ENG. L. REV., ON REMAND: BLOG (June 29,
2016), https://newenglrev.com/2016/06/29/faculty-blog-utah-v-strieff-the-court-reminds-usthat-constitutional-privacy-is-essentially-meaningless [https://perma.cc/7QHV-U2U3]; Orin
Kerr, Opinion Analysis: The Exclusionary Rule is Weakened But It Still Lives, SCOTUSBLOG
(June 20, 2016, 9:35 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/opinion-analysis-the-exclusionary-rule-is-weakened-but-it-still-lives/ [https://perma.cc/T82P-JFDR] (noting, inter alia,
his agreement with Justice Kagan that the decision encourages police to effectuate suspicionless stops); Orin Kerr, Supreme Court Construes the Exclusionary Rule Narrowly in
Utah v. Strieff, WASH. POST (June 21, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/06/21/supreme-court-construes-the-exclusionary-rule-narrowlyin-utah-v-strieff/ [https://perma.cc/TE8W-DUT5]; Katherine MacFarlane, Utah v. Strieff
May Shrink Civil Rights Damages and Limit Section 1983’s Deterrence Potential, AM.
CONST. SOC’Y: ACS BLOG (July 12, 2016), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/utah-v-strieffmay-shrink-civil-rights-damages-and-limit-section-1983%E2%80%99s-deterrence-potential [https://perma.cc/Z9FN-J5Y5] (discussing the likely disproportionate impact of Strieff
upon minorities as well as the diminishment of civil damages remedies that attends to the
decision); The Editorial Board, Another Hit to the Fourth Amendment, N.Y. TIMES (June
20, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/21/opinion/another-hit-to-the-fourth-amendment.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/7Y3Z-RQN2]; Ronald Tyler, Utah v. Strieff: A Bad Decision on Policing with a Gripping Dissent by Justice Sotomayor, STAN. L. SCH.: LEGAL
AGGREGATE BLOG (July 5, 2016), https://law.stanford.edu/2016/07/05/utah-v-strieff-a-bad.decision-on-policing-with-a-gripping-dissent-by-justice-sotomayor [https://perma.cc/S7WSC43D].
26. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2073–74 (2016).
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remedy. Specifically, it will argue for the repeal of the Court’s good faith,
attenuated circumstances, and inevitable discovery exceptions to the exclusionary rule, and it will advocate for an expansive third-party standing
doctrine. It will emphasize the importance of persistent judicial review of
police conduct and make the case that, absent meaningful and consistent
judicial oversight, long-term prospects for reforming police culture and
practices will be difficult to achieve. In making this argument, this article
will examine the federal consent decree process. In particular, it will focus
upon federal attempts at police reform in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and
in Cleveland, Ohio, and will explain how these experiences inform the
debate about police reform and are highly instructive regarding the need
for persistent and authoritative judicial oversight of police activity.
I. MAPP V. OHIO AND THE SUPREME COURT’S
STANDING JURISPRUDENCE
In 1961 the Supreme Court in Mapp v. Ohio held that the exclusionary
rule was a constitutional mandate and was, therefore, applicable to the
states.27 In reaching this decision, the Court reversed Wolf v. Colorado,
which twelve years earlier held that, in the context of state criminal prosecutions in state courts, the exclusion of evidence obtained by virtue of
unconstitutional searches or seizures was not mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment.28 Mapp was a Fourth Amendment case that involved
an unconstitutional search of the defendant’s residence that uncovered
various incriminating materials.29 The recovery of these items led to the
defendant’s indictment, and ultimate conviction, for having knowingly
possessed and “control[ed] certain lewd and lascivious books, pictures,
and photographs.”30 Mapp reasoned that an exclusion mandate was necessary to give substance to the Fourth Amendment right.31 Without the
sanction of exclusion, the Court declared that the Fourth Amendment’s
safeguards would constitute an empty promise.32 As the Court stated,
“[t]o hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to w[i]thhold its
privilege and enjoyment.”33 It added that this result was “logical” and
based upon “common sense,” and that a contrary rule would “encourage
disobedience to the Federal Constitution.”34
Of course, the sweeping decision in Mapp would be largely worthless if
defendants did not have meaningful access to the courts to challenge the
admissibility of evidence seized by the government. At the time of Mapp,
a comparatively broad standing landscape was in place. A year earlier, in
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

367 U.S. 643, 653–60 (1961).
338 U.S. 25, 48 (1949).
367 U.S. at 643.
Id. at 643–45.
Id. at 655–56.
Id.
Id. at 656.
Id. at 657.
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1960, the Supreme Court in Jones v. United States35 identified four bases
upon which standing could be achieved: by demonstrating 1) a possessory
interest in the challenged evidence, 2) a legitimate presence on the property that was searched, 3) a personal privacy interest, and 4) that he was
the intended target of a government search.36 In Jones the defendant
challenged the admission of narcotics found in an apartment where he did
not reside but was present at the time of the government search.37 In
finding that the defendant had standing to challenge the search of the
apartment, the Court concluded that the defendant had automatic standing due to the possessory nature of the offense and because he was legitimately on the premises at the time of the government search.38
In regards to automatic standing, the Court declared that the nature of
the crimes charged—possessory narcotics offenses—was sufficient to afford the defendant standing. The Court explained that possession cases
presented a “special problem.”39 Specifically, for a defendant to establish
standing in a possession case, he would have to admit to facts (ownership
or a possessory interest) that linked him with the items that he had been
charged with possessing.40 This created a “dilemma”—he could elect to
forgo a challenge to the admissibility of the evidence, or he could pursue
such a challenge but at the price of providing the government with evidence that could be admitted against him at his criminal trial.41 Troubled
by this, the Court declared: “to hold that petitioner’s failure to acknowledge interest in the narcotics or the premises prevented his attack upon
the search, would be to permit the Government to have the advantage of
contradictory positions as a basis for conviction.”42 Thus, to avoid this
result, defendants in such cases were conferred automatic standing to
mount constitutional challenges.43
The Court also found that the defendant had standing given that he
was legitimately on the premises at the time of the search.44 The Court
35. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
36. Id. at 261–65. The following language from Jones is the basis for the “target” theory of standing:
In order to qualify as a “person aggrieved by an unlawful search and
seizure,” one must have been a victim of a search or seizure, one against
whom the search was directed, as distinguished from one who claims
prejudice only through the use of evidence gathered as a consequence of a
search or seizure directed at someone else.
Id. at 261. But see Jefferson D. Sellers, Standing to Raise Fourth Amendment Guarantees
Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures: Rakas v. Illinois, 15 TULSA L. J. 85, 93 (1979)
(“This directed at or target theory of standing had never expressly been held an independent basis for standing by the Supreme Court, but the language had continued to appear
after Jones. While case law support for this theory was sparse, legal commentators had
endorsed it.”).
37. 362 U.S. at 258–59.
38. Id. at 261–67.
39. Id. at 261.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 262.
42. Id. at 263.
43. Jones, 362 U.S. at 264.
44. Id. at 266–67.
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determined that the defendant established that his presence in the apartment was with the permission of its owner.45 In response to the government’s contention that only those with more “domiciled” associations
with property should have standing, the Court deemed it “ill-advised” to
engage in “subtle distinctions” between classifications such as “lessee[s],”
“licensee[s],” “invitee[s],” and “guest[s].”46 To permit constitutional challenges based upon a defendant’s demonstration of his legitimate presence
would, in the Court’s view, compromise “[n]o just interest of the Government in the effective and rigorous enforcement of the criminal law.”47
Thus, when Mapp was decided, the exclusionary rule was a constitutional mandate, and defendant access to the courts was comparatively expansive. But shortly thereafter, the dismantling of this comparatively
broad swath of rights commenced. In the standing context, this curtailment began with Simmons v. United States, which was decided shortly
before the close of the Warren Court era and only seven years after
Mapp.48
Among the issues in Simmons was whether the trial court properly admitted testimony from a suppression hearing given by one of the three
defendants at his bank robbery trial.49 On the day of the robbery, the
police searched the residence of the mother of one of the defendants
(Andrews).50 The search produced incriminating evidence that was found
inside a suitcase.51 A second defendant (Garrett) sought to suppress the
evidence and, in an attempt to establish standing, testified that the suitcase “was similar to one he had owned, and that he was the owner of
clothing found inside the suitcase.”52 Garrett was unsuccessful, and his
suppression hearing testimony was admitted at his trial.53
The Court noted that Fourth Amendment rights are personal and can
be enforced “only at the instance of one whose own protection was in45. Id. at 265.
46. Id. at 266.
47. Id. at 267.
48. See generally Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968). That same year
(1968), the Court passed on an opportunity to further expand the standing landscape in
Alderman v. United States. 364 U.S. 165, 174 (1968). The case involved an illegal electronic
eavesdropping that occurred in a place of business of one of three defendants. Id. at
167–68. The remaining two defendants contended that they had standing to contest the
propriety of the electronic surveillance since the rights of the business owner had been
violated. Id. at 174. The Court rejected this third-party standing argument. Id. The Court
stated that it found a “substantial difference” between suppressing evidence on behalf of
an individual who had “evidence illegally seized from him” versus an individual “who cannot claim this predicate for exclusion.” Id. The Court was not persuaded that the added
deterrence value attendant to allowing such third-party standing “would justify further encroachment upon the public interest in prosecuting those accused of crime and having
them acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth.” Id. at
174–75.
49. 390 U.S. at 382.
50. Id. at 380.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 381.
53. Id.

300

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

fringed by the search and seizure.”54 The Court further recognized the
automatic standing precedent that had been established in Jones for offenses for which possession is an essential element.55 But the Court noted
that Simmons was not a possession case, yet presented the same conundrum that was present in Jones.56 It explained that Garrett’s absence
from the house at the time of the search precluded reliance upon a legitimate presence theory of standing.57 Therefore, “[t]he only, or at least the
most natural” alternative was for Garrett to testify at the suppression
hearing and attempt to demonstrate an ownership interest.58 The Court
found that Garrett faced an “intolerable” dilemma—that he “either [had]
to give up what he believed . . . to be a valid Fourth Amendment claim or,
. . . waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.”59
Thus, the Court held that a defendant’s testimony at a suppression hearing could “not thereafter be admitted against him at trial on the issue of
guilt unless he makes no objection.”60
The advantage of the Jones automatic standing rule was that it enabled
defendants to bring forth constitutional challenges without requiring defendants to testify. And when defendants do not take the witness stand,
they can proceed to pursue constitutional claims without fear that their
words will be used against them substantively or for impeachment purposes. Simmons continued this protection to the extent that it prohibited
the substantive use of any information provided by the defendant at a
suppression hearing against him at his criminal trial. But what was uncertain after Simmons was whether defendant testimony could be used for
impeachment purposes, and this confusion persisted for several years.61
For the defendant who testified at his suppression hearing but elected not
to take the stand at his trial, Simmons provided sufficient protection.
However, the scope of protections afforded by Simmons for the defendant who testified at his suppression hearing and at his trial remained
unclear. By undermining automatic standing, Simmons reintroduced the
“dilemma” that was eliminated in Jones. For the defendant who intended
to testify at his trial, or at the very least was contemplating such a tactic,
Simmons required that a defendant, in certain jurisdictions, reconsider
the decision to testify pretrial given the uncertainty regarding whether his
54. Id. at 389.
55. Simmons, 390 U.S. at 390.
56. Id. (“For a defendant who wishes to establish standing must do so at the risk that
the words which he utters may later be used to incriminate him.” Id. at 392–93.).
57. Id. at 390.
58. Id. at 391.
59. Id. at 394.
60. Id.
61. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 93 n.8 (1980) (“A number of courts considering the question have held that such testimony is admissible as evidence of impeachment.
Gray v. State, 43 Md. App. 238, 403 A.2d 853 (1979); People v. Douglas, 66 Cal. App. 3d
998, 136 CAL. RPTR. 358 (1977); People v. Sturgis, 58 Ill. 2d 211, 317 N.E. 2d 545 (1974). See
also Woody v. United States, 126 U.S. App. D.C. 353, 354–355, 379 F.2d 130, 131–132 (Burger, J.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 961, 88 S. Ct. 342, 19 L. Ed.2d 371 (1967).”).
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or her testimony could be used for impeachment purposes.62
In 1978, the Court decided Rakas v. Illinois,63 which not only further
circumscribed the standing landscape, but also enunciated the current
predominant standard to establish standing.64 Rakas involved a challenge
to an automobile search by two individuals who did not own the vehicle,
but were merely passengers.65 The defendants asserted two bases for
standing, citing Jones as authority.66 First, they claimed that they had
standing because they were the targets of the government investigation,67
and second, because they were legitimately present in the vehicle.68 The
Court rejected both of these claims.69
The Court stressed that Fourth Amendment safeguards are personal,
and can be asserted only by individuals who can demonstrate that the
government violated their own constitutional rights.70 The governing
standard is:
[W]hether the challenged search or seizure violated the Fourth
Amendment rights of a criminal defendant who seeks to exclude the
evidence obtained during it . . . [and] requires a determination of
whether the disputed search and seizure has infringed an interest of
the defendant which the Fourth Amendment was designed to
protect.71
Thus, the Court concluded that since the defendants did not have a
personal interest that was allegedly violated, their Fourth Amendment
rights were not infringed.72 Although the Court rejected the Jones target
and legitimate presence on the premises theories of standings (which had
the effect of affording standing to third parties), the Court stopped short
of overruling Jones.73
The official demise of Jones finally came in 1980 in United States v.
Salvucci.74 The defendants were charged with unlawful possession of stolen mail.75 The mail was discovered by the police during the execution of
62. Morgan G. Graham, The Use of Suppression Hearing Testimony to Impeach, 59
IND. L. J. 295, 295 (1984).
63. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
64. Recently, the Court, in a pair of cases, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012)
and Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013), held that an individual can also assert a
Fourth Amendment claim by means of a trespass test. “The Katz reasonable-expectations
test ‘has been added to, not substituted for,’ the traditional property-based understanding
of the Fourth Amendment.” Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417.
65. 439 U.S. at 129–30.
66. Id. at 132.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 133, 148.
70. Id. at 138. The Court also stated that it is more appropriate or “logical” to view the
questions presented as Fourth Amendment inquiries rather than standing issues. Id. at 140.
71. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 140.
72. Id. at 148–49.
73. Id. at 142–43.
74. 448 U.S. 83, 85 (1980).
75. Id.
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a search warrant at the home of the mother of one of the defendants.76
The First Circuit Court of Appeals found that the defendants had automatic standing to challenge the constitutionality of the government’s
seizure.77 The Supreme Court, however, overruled Jones finding that the
bases that undergirded the decision had “eroded.”78
The Court addressed and rejected two bases for standing urged by the
petitioners that were identified in Jones: automatic standing and an individual’s possessory interest in the challenged evidence.79 As for automatic standing, the Court reasoned, in part, that Simmons “eliminated”
the quandary referenced in Jones.80 In fact, the Court declared that Simmons extended its protections against self-incrimination to possession
cases, such as Jones, and to nonpossessory offenses.81 Central to its reasoning was the Rakas legitimate expectation of privacy standard.82 According to the Court, there is nothing contradictory about a prosecutor
maintaining that a defendant criminally possessed an item yet was deprived of standing to contest its seizure.83 As the Court explained:
To conclude that a prosecutor engaged in self-contradiction in Jones,
the Court necessarily relied on the unexamined assumption that a
defendant’s possession of a seized good sufficient to establish criminal culpability was also sufficient to establish Fourth Amendment
“standing.” This assumption, however, even if correct at the time, is
no longer so.
The person in legal possession of a good seized during an illegal
search has not necessarily been subject to a Fourth Amendment deprivation. As we hold today in Rawlings v. Kentucky, [448 U.S. 98
(1980)] legal possession of a seized good is not a proxy for determining whether the owner had a Fourth Amendment interest, for it does
not invariably represent the protected Fourth Amendment interest.84
This reasoning, according to the Court, similarly undercut Jones’s possessory interest in an item basis for standing.85 The Court explained that
an individual’s possessory interest, though relevant to the Rakas inquiry,
is “too broad a gauge” to assess Fourth Amendment standing.86 Rather, it
reiterated that the pertinent inquiry is whether a claimant can establish a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the area where the search
occurred.87
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id. at 85–86.
Id. at 89, 95.
Id. at 84–85.
Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 89.
Id. at 90.
Id. at 94–95.
Id. at 90.
Id. at 90–91.
Id. at 92–93.
Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 90–93.
Id. at 92–93.
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The Court sidestepped the question left open in Simmons—whether
the government could use a defendant’s testimony from a suppression
hearing for impeachment purposes.88 The Court reasoned that the impeachment issue “more aptly relates to the proper breadth of the Simmons privilege, and not to the need for retaining automatic standing.”89
The Court acknowledged that it had yet to definitively address this question.90 However, it is now fairly settled that a defendant may be impeached at trial with his testimony given at a pretrial hearing.91
The exclusionary rule was at its zenith in 1961. Yet, only seven years
after Mapp, which declared the exclusionary rule a constitutional mandate, and only eight years after Jones, which identified multiple bases by
which standing could be attained, this period of comparatively broad access began to unravel. After the Salvucci decision in 1980, the landscape
of eligible challengers to officer conduct had been substantially reduced.
Of the four Jones standards, three have been eviscerated. Constitutional
challenges by third-parties—plainly allowable pursuant to the target and
legitimate presence approaches—are now gone. And individuals who had
a possessory or ownership interest in an item seized but lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area of the search also lack standing to
pursue a constitutional challenge.
Standing is the gateway to the exclusion of evidence. If the exclusionary rule is to be effectual then individuals must have meaningful access to
the courts. Absent such access, even the most robust exclusionary rule
pronouncement will be severely compromised. As this section detailed,
however, nineteen years after Mapp the standing requirements had been
reinterpreted to allow only a narrow class of individuals to pursue constitutional challenges. And as Part II demonstrates, the exclusionary rule
itself has gone through a significant curtailment.
II. THE DECLINE OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
As noted, Mapp found that the exclusionary rule was a constitutional
requirement.92 Thus, if an officer obtained evidence by virtue of an unconstitutional search or seizure, the Fourth Amendment mandated that
the evidence be excluded at the defendant’s trial. The Court did not in88. Id. at 93–94.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 1 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 1:33 (4th ed. 2016). (“Pretty clearly Simmons does not block use of testimony by the
accused in suppression motions when it is later offered to impeach his trial testimony. In
Salvucci the Court noted that Simmons left this question open, and came close to approving this use. More importantly, it is settled that illegally obtained evidence can itself be
offered at trial to impeach the accused if he testifies, even if taken in violation of the
Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth Amendment and otherwise subject to exclusion on those grounds.”);
United States v. Mitchell, No. 12-172, 2015 WL 5886198, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct 7, 2015) (noting that while the Third Circuit had yet to determine whether suppression hearing testimony could be used for impeachment purposes, every circuit that has considered the issue
has approved such use).
92. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 649 (1961).

304

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

corporate any balancing tests or include any other criteria to factor.
Mapp’s language was sweeping and unambiguous, its tone was passionate, and its conclusions were rooted in judicial integrity. Preservation of
the public trust was paramount. The Court feared that an outcome that
reflected judicial tolerance of an officer’s constitutional misdeeds would
breed public mistrust and produce anarchy.93 As the Court stated:
As Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting, said in Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928): “Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its
example. . . If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it
invites anarchy.”
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to
destroy the entire system of constitutional restraints on which the
liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized that the right to
privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against
the States, and that the right to be secure against rude invasions of
privacy by state officers is, therefore, constitutional in origin, we can
no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise. Because it is
enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic
rights secured by the Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it
to be revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of
law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more
than that which the Constitution guarantees him, to the police officer
no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to
the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice.94
The Court also reasoned that exclusion was necessary in order to incentivize law enforcement to respect constitutional safeguards. The threat of
exclusion, the Court declared, would discourage officer “disobedience”
and would ultimately promote, as opposed to hamper, effective law enforcement.95 The Court stated:
Presently, a federal prosecutor may make no use of evidence illegally
seized, but a State’s attorney across the street may, although he supposedly is operating under the enforceable prohibitions of the same
Amendment. Thus the State, by admitting evidence unlawfully
seized, serves to encourage disobedience to the Federal Constitution
which it is bound to uphold. . . In non-exclusionary States, federal
officers, being human, were by it invited to and did, as our cases
indicate, step across the street to the State’s attorney with their unconstitutionally seized evidence. Prosecution on the basis of that evidence was then had in a state court in utter disregard of the
enforceable Fourth Amendment. If the fruits of an unconstitutional
93. Id. at 659.
94. Id. at 659–60.
95. Id. at 657.
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search had been inadmissible in both state and federal courts, this
inducement to evasion would have been sooner eliminated. . .
Federal-state cooperation in the solution of crime under constitutional standards will be promoted, if only by recognition of their now
mutual obligation to respect the same fundamental criteria in their
approaches. “However much in a particular case insistence upon
such rules may appear as a technicality that inures to the benefit of a
guilty person, the history of the criminal law proves that tolerance of
shortcut methods in law enforcement impairs its enduring
effectiveness.”96
Mapp’s exclusion mandate and its overarching concern for judicial integrity, however, soon gave way to a revised constitutional interpretation
and a new primary rationale. Already undercut by the Court’s swift retreat from the comparatively broad standing parameters delineated in
Jones, subsequent cases have significantly retooled and weakened the exclusionary rule doctrine. As the next section explains, the exclusionary
rule is no longer a constitutional rule, is applied only when significant
officer deterrence can be achieved, and is subject to several exceptions
that have rendered the rule a shell of its former self. The next section
begins this discussion with the attenuated circumstances exception to the
exclusionary rule.
A. THE ATTENUATED CIRCUMSTANCES
GOOD FAITH EXCEPTIONS

AND

Unquestionably, the largest crater in the exclusionary rule landscape
has come by virtue of the “good faith” exception. The case that launched
this exception, United States v. Leon,97 and its progeny will be discussed
later in this section. However, this article will initially discuss another exception to the exclusionary rule—the attenuated circumstances doctrine.
Discussion of this doctrine is apt at this point not only because Utah v.
Strieff, the Supreme Court’s most recent exclusionary rule pronouncement, is an attenuated circumstances case, but also because this exception
was announced by the Warren Court only two years after Mapp. In Wong
Sun v. United States,98 the Supreme Court held that a defendant who had
been arrested without probable cause, arraigned, and released on his personal recognizance, was not entitled to have statements that he made several days later during a voluntary return trip to the police station
suppressed, since his remarks were attenuated from the initial illegality.99
In the early morning hours of June 4, 1959, federal narcotics agents
arrested an individual (“Hom Way”) on narcotics charges.100 Way made a
statement to the agents identifying an individual (“Blackie Toy”) as a per96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 657–58.
468 U.S. 897 (1984).
371 U.S. 471 (1963).
Id. at 491.
Id. at 473.
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son from whom he had recently purchased heroin.101 Way’s statement
also linked Toy with a certain laundry business.102 At 6:00 a.m. the same
day (before the store had opened), the agents arrived at that laundry,
made a forcible entry, and made an arrest of James Wah Toy, the proprietor of the business.103 Toy, in turn, made a statement in which he denied
having sold heroin to Way,104 but he identified another individual
(“Johnny”) as someone who sold narcotics, and he informed the agents
where Johnny could be located.105 The agents then “left immediately”106
for that location and, upon arrival, entered the home and discovered an
individual, Johnny Yee, located therein.107 Yee gave the officers a small
quantity of heroin that he pulled “from a bureau drawer.”108 Shortly
thereafter, the officers took Yee and Toy to the narcotics bureau for questioning, whereupon Yee informed the agents that an individual (“Sea
Dog”) had supplied him with the heroin.109 Toy informed the agents that
“‘Sea Dog’ was Wong Sun” and then traveled with the agents to Wong
Sun’s residence.110 An agent and several other officers later “climbed the
stairs and entered the apartment” and arrested Wong Sun.111 That same
day, Toy and Yee were arraigned on narcotics charges.112 Wong Sun was
arraigned the following day. All three defendants were released on their
own recognizance.113
A few days later at the narcotics bureau, the three defendants were
interrogated by one of the agents.114 After advising them of certain
rights, the agent asked questions of each defendant, prepared a statement, and then showed the prepared statement to each defendant. Wong
Sun informed the agent that the statement was accurate, but he refused to
sign it.115
Wong Sun was indicted on federal narcotics charges.116 He challenged
the admissibility of his statements made to the agent, arguing that they
should be suppressed as the fruit of his illegal arrest.117 In rejecting Wong
Sun’s claim, the Supreme Court acknowledged the unconstitutionality of
his arrest.118 Nevertheless, the Court found that since “Wong Sun had
101.
102.
103.
104.
at 475.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 473–74.
A search of the location failed to uncover any illegal narcotics. Wong Sun, 371 U.S.
Id. at 474.
Id. at 474–75.
Id. at 475.
Id.
Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 475.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 476.
Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 477.
Id. at 472–73.
Id. at 478.
Id. at 491.
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been released on his own recognizance after a lawful arraignment, and
had returned voluntarily several days later to make the statement, . . .
that the connection between the arrest and the statement had ‘become so
attenuated as to dissipate the taint.’”119
The attenuated circumstances doctrine thus allows for the admission of
illegally seized evidence that is the direct byproduct of a constitutional
breach on the part of law enforcement. The rationale for the Court’s decision did not rest upon a finding that a direct link did not exist. Rather, the
Court found that other factors—Wong Sun’s release from custody, the
passage of time, and his voluntary return to the narcotics bureau—dissipated the taint from the earlier constitutional infraction.120
Twelve years later, application of the doctrine was again at issue in
Brown v. Illinois.121 Brown was arrested by police officers as he was
walking up a rear staircase leading to the rear door of his apartment.122
One of the officers was already inside Brown’s residence at the time of
the arrest, and a second was outside behind Brown on the staircase.123
Brown was later indicted for murder.124 After arriving at the police stationhouse, Brown was advised of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona.125 Brown then made incriminating statements.126 He unsuccessfully
moved the trial court to suppress the statements as being the product of
an illegal arrest.127 The Illinois Supreme Court found that Brown’s arrest
was illegal, but concluded that the provision of Miranda warnings “served
to break the causal connection between the illegal arrest and the giving of
the statements,” thus rendering the defendant’s actions a voluntary act
attenuated from the original tainted conduct.128
The Supreme Court found that Brown’s statements were the product of
his illegal arrest, and that the provision of Miranda warnings did not attenuate the confessions from the original taint.129 In reaching this decision, the Court stated that, for the causal link between Brown’s
unconstitutional arrest and his subsequent statements to be severed,
“Wong Sun requires not merely that the statement meet the Fifth
Amendment standard of voluntariness but that it be ‘sufficiently an act of
free will to purge the primary taint.’”130 The Court rejected any suggestion that Miranda warnings alone could serve as a per se attenuating factor.131 To hold otherwise, the Court concluded, would “substantially
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id.
Id.
422 U.S. 590, 591–92 (1975).
Id. at 592.
Id.
Id. at 596.
Id. at 594.
Id. at 594–95.
Brown, 422 U.S. at 596.
Id. at 596–97.
Id. at 605.
Id. at 602.
Id. at 602–03.
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dilute[ ]” the exclusionary rule, would incentivize officers to disregard individual constitutional protections, and would render the Fourth Amendment an empty promise.132 The Court acknowledged that the provision of
Miranda warnings is an appropriate factor to consider when assessing attenuation but declared that it was only one criterion.133
The Court then noted that there was an insignificant time separation—
”less than two hours”—between Brown’s illegal arrest and his incriminating remarks and that there were no meaningful “intervening event[s].”134
Finally, it found that the actions of the officers were deliberate, making
the following observations:
The imp[ro]priety of the arrest was obvious; awareness of that fact
was virtually conceded by the two detectives when they repeatedly
acknowledged, in their testimony, that the purpose of their action
was “for investigation” or for “questioning.” The arrest, both in design and in execution, was investigatory. The detectives embarked
upon this expedition for evidence in the hope that something might
turn up. The manner in which Brown’s arrest was affected gives the
appearance of having been calculated to cause surprise, fright, and
confusion.135
The Court reversed the Illinois Supreme Court and the case was
remanded.136
132. Id.
133. Brown, 422 U.S. at 603–04 (noting “[t]he temporal proximity of the arrest and the
confession, the presence of intervening circumstances, and, particularly, the purpose and
flagrancy of the official misconduct” as relevant factors).
134. Id. at 604–05 (“[T]here was no intervening event of significance whatsoever. In its
essentials, his situation is remarkably like that of James Wah Toy in Wong Sun. We could
hold Brown’s first statement admissible only if we overrule Wong Sun. We decline to do so.
And the second statement was clearly the result and the fruit of the first.”).
135. Id. at 605.
136. Id. In 1978, in United States v. Ceccolini, the Court again addressed an issue involving application of the attenuation doctrine. 435 U.S. 268 (1978). While in a flower store, a
local police officer, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, opened an envelope that was
on a counter and viewed its contents. Id. at 270. Inside the envelope was money and policy
slips. Id. The flower store had been a place under surveillance by the F.B.I. for gambling
related activity. Id. at 271. When the officer asked an employee to whom the envelope
belonged, the employee named Ceccolini. Id. at 270. The officer did not inform the employee that he had opened the envelope and viewed its contents. Id. The local police department, in turn, notified the F.B.I. of its findings. Id. About four months later, the F.B.I.
interviewed the employee about the envelope and Ceccolini. Id. at 272. Eventually, Ceccolini was summoned to testify before the grand jury, where he denied his involvement in
gambling activities. Id. The employee also testified before the grand jury and contradicted
Ceccolini’s claims. Id. Ceccolini was later indicted for perjury. Id. The district and circuit
courts found that the employee’s testimony against Ceccolini should have been suppressed
since it was the fruit of the illegal search of the envelope. Id. at 272–73. The Supreme Court
reversed. Id. at 280. The Court drew a distinction between the recovery of physical versus
verbal testimony. Of importance to the Court was that witnesses, unlike physical evidence,
can exhibit free wills and that the exercise of this will can attenuate the taint from an
earlier constitutional breach. Id. at 275–80. The Court stated:
The evidence indicates overwhelmingly that the testimony given by the witness was an act of her own free will in no way coerced or even induced by
official authority as a result of [the officer’s] discovery of the policy slips. Nor
were the slips themselves used in questioning [the employee]. Substantial periods of time elapsed between the time of the illegal search and the initial
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Nine years after Brown, the Court announced another major exception
to the exclusionary rule. In United States v. Leon,137 the Supreme Court
held that evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant that is executed in
good faith reliance by an officer is not subject to the exclusionary rule.138
Specifically, Leon involved the execution of a “facially valid search warrant” which resulted in the recovery of illegal narcotics and other incriminating evidence.139 The validity of the warrant was challenged at a
pretrial suppression hearing, and the motion to suppress was granted, in
part, by the district court.140 The Court of Appeals subsequently
affirmed.141
The Supreme Court, however, reversed.142 The Court found that the
exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy and that its primary objective is “to deter police misconduct.”143 It deemed the issue of the exclusionary rule’s application an inquiry separate from whether an
individual’s Fourth Amendment rights were infringed.144 Further,
whether the exclusionary rule was applied in a given case was dependent
upon a cost-benefit review.145 Noting the rule’s “substantial social costs”
upon the criminal justice system’s “truth-finding function[ ],” the Court
found that “when law enforcement officers have acted in objective good
faith or their transgressions have been minor, the magnitude of the benefit conferred on such guilty defendants offends basic concepts of the crimcontact with the witness, on the one hand, and between the latter and the
testimony at trial on the other. While the particular knowledge to which [the
employee] testified at trial can be logically traced back to [the officer’s] discovery of the policy slips both the identity of [the employee] and her relationship with the respondent were well known to those investigating the case.
There is, in addition, not the slightest evidence to suggest that [the officer]
entered the shop or picked up the envelope with the intent of finding tangible evidence bearing on an illicit gambling operation, much less any suggestion that he entered the shop and searched with the intent of finding a willing
and knowledgeable witness to testify against respondent. Application of the
exclusionary rule in this situation could not have the slightest deterrent effect
on the behavior of an officer . . . The cost of permanently silencing [the employee] is too great for an evenhanded system of law enforcement to bear in
order to secure such a speculative and very likely negligible deterrent effect.
[T]he exclusionary rule should be invoked with much greater reluctance
where the claim is based on a causal relationship between a constitutional
violation and the discovery of a live witness than when a similar claim is
advanced to support suppression of an inanimate object.
Id. at 279–80.
137. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
138. Id. at 913.
139. Id. at 902.
140. Id. at 903.
141. Id. at 904.
142. Id. at 905.
143. Leon, 468 U.S. at 916.
144. Id. at 906.
145. Id. at 906–07 (“[I]t must be resolved by weighing the costs and benefits of preventing the use in the prosecution’s case in chief of inherently trustworthy tangible evidence
obtained in reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate that
ultimately is found to be defective.”).
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inal justice system.”146
In a series of cases decided since Leon, the good faith rationale, and its
deterrence emphasis, has been applied in a series of different factual constructs. In Illinois v. Krull, the Supreme Court upheld the admission of
incriminating evidence found by an officer who performed an administrative search of a junk yard pursuant to a statute that was subsequently
found to be unconstitutional.147 The Court found that the officer performed the search with a good faith belief that the statute was valid, and
that suppression of the evidence would not further the deterrence rationale underlying the rule.148 In Arizona v. Evans, the Court held that evidence recovered by officers subsequent to an unconstitutional arrest of
the defendant after a vehicular stop should not be suppressed when a
member of the judicial staff incorrectly informed the arresting officer that
the defendant had an outstanding warrant.149 Since the fault rested with
the judicial staff, as opposed to the police, the Court reasoned that suppression would not further the rule’s deterrence objective.150
In 2009, the Court held in Herring v. United States that evidence found
on the defendant’s person and his vehicle pursuant to a search incident to
arrest should not be suppressed when the arresting officer was erroneously informed by a police department in a different county that the defendant had an outstanding warrant.151 The Court declared that the
suppression of evidence is a “last resort,” exclusion is required only when
meaningful deterrence can be achieved, and the deterrence benefits must
outweigh the substantial costs that append to suppression.152 Finding that
suppression was not warranted, the Court reasoned that the officer’s conduct was the product of “nonrecurring and attenuated negligence,” and
did not rise to the level of culpability necessary to further the purpose of
the exclusionary rule.153 Specifically, the Court stated:
An error that arises from nonrecurring and attenuated negligence is
thus far removed from the core concerns that led us to adopt the rule
146. Id. at 907–08. The Court concluded:
If exclusion of evidence obtained pursuant to a subsequently invalidated warrant is to have any deterrent effect, therefore, it must alter the behavior of
individual law enforcement officers or the policies of their departments. . . .
[S]uppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant should be ordered
only on a case-by-case basis and only in those unusual cases in which exclusion will further the purposes of the exclusionary rule.
...
We conclude that the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of
exclusion.
Id. at 918, 922.
147. 480 U.S. 340, 342–43, 356–59 (1987).
148. Id. at 347–57.
149. 514 U.S. 1, 10–16 (1995).
150. Id. at 10–15.
151. 555 U.S. 135–37 (2009).
152. Id. at 140–41.
153. Id. at 144.
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in the first place. And in fact since Leon, we have never applied the
rule to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, where the police conduct was no more intentional or culpable
than this.
To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently
deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently
culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice
system. As laid out in our cases, the exclusionary rule serves to deter
deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence. The error in this case does
not rise to that level.154
Certainly, one of the most notable features of Herring is that the Court
applied the good faith exception when the fault rested with the police
department (as opposed to the judiciary or legislature). However, Herring involved a situation where the fault rested with a police department
in a different county. In Davis v. United States,155 decided in 2011, the
Court applied the good faith exception to a factual scenario where the
fault was attributable to the officer who performed a vehicular search.156
Davis involved an arrest of a driver (which was valid), followed by a
search of his vehicle.157 The officer’s search complied with the Supreme
Court precedent in existence at that time.158 However, during the pendency of the defendant’s case, the law changed, rendering the vehicular
search at issue unconstitutional.159 Though the Court agreed that the new
law governed the constitutionality of the search, it disagreed that the evidence should be suppressed.160 The officer, according to the Court, engaged in “conscientious police work.”161 It concluded that since
“suppression would do nothing to deter police misconduct in these circumstances, and because it would come at a high cost to both the truth
and the public safety, we hold that searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject to the
exclusionary rule.”162
The standing cases aside, Leon and its progeny are unquestionably the
principal explanation for the exclusionary rule’s precipitous decline. For
years, the Court’s attenuation doctrine jurisprudence had remained
largely dormant, but it recently reemerged with a splash in Hudson v.
Michigan, decided in 2006,163 and Utah v. Strieff, which was decided ten
years later. Both cases announced decisions which expanded the scope of
the attenuation doctrine.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id.
564 U.S. 229 (2011).
Id. at 232.
Id. at 235.
Id.
Id. at 236.
Id. at 240.
Davis, 564 U.S at 241.
Id. at 232.
547 U.S. 586 (2006).
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Hudson involved a search of a residence that was preceded by a violation of the knock and announce rule.164 This statutory rule requires that
officers announce their presence prior to entering a residence to execute
a search warrant.165 The Court held that the evidence should not be suppressed.166 In reaching its decision, the Court dismissed Mapp’s pronouncements regarding the constitutionality of the exclusionary rule as
“[e]xpansive dicta,” and stated that exclusion is not a necessary byproduct of a constitutional infringement.167
The Court then reached two conclusions of particular interest to this
section. First, it found that the evidence recovered was not a direct consequence of the knock and announce violation.168 Specifically, the Court
stated:
In this case, of course, the constitutional violation of an illegal manner of entry was not a but-for cause of obtaining the evidence.
Whether that preliminary misstep had occurred or not, the police
would have executed the warrant they had obtained, and would have
discovered the gun and drugs inside the house.169
Second, and more significantly, the Court announced a new, expansive
interpretation of the attenuation doctrine.170 Assuming a connection between the constitutional infraction and the seized evidence, the Court
stated that attenuation can occur when the connection between the constitutional infraction and the derivative evidence is remote and when the
connection is direct.171 It explained that when the purposes that underlie
a constitutional safeguard “would not be served by suppression of the
evidence obtained,” the recovered evidence is attenuated from the original taint and should not be suppressed.172 It identified three purposes
served by the knock and announce rule: “the protection of human life
and limb;” “the protection of property;” and protection against “those
elements of privacy and dignity that can be destroyed by a sudden entrance.”173 The Court stated that these interests are distinct from the interests served by the Fourth Amendment—the protection against
unreasonable government searches and seizures.174 Thus, the Court concluded that “[s]ince the interests that were violated in this case have nothing to do with the seizure of the evidence, the exclusionary rule is
inapplicable.”175
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 588.
Id. at 589.
Id. at 599.
Id. at 591–92.
Id. at 594.
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 592.
See id. at 593.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 594.
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 593–94.
Id. at 594.
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Then, in 2016, the Supreme Court decided Utah v. Strieff.176 At issue
was “whether th[e] attenuation doctrine applies when an officer makes an
unconstitutional investigatory stop; learns during that stop that the suspect is subject to a valid arrest warrant; and proceeds to arrest the suspect
and seize incriminating evidence during a search incident to that arrest.”177 The Court answered this question in the affirmative.178
In response to an anonymous tip regarding narcotics activity at a local
residence, the South Salt Lake City police commenced an investigation.179 For approximately seven days, Officer Fackrell observed enough
individuals entering the residence and staying for only “a few minutes” to
generate his suspicions that illegal narcotics transactions were occurring
within the residence.180 When he saw Strieff leave the residence and walk
in the direction of a nearby business, the officer stopped Strieff, and after
informing Strieff of his identity, Fackrell inquired about Strieff’s purpose
for visiting the residence.181 In response to a request by Fackrell, Strieff
handed the officer his Utah identification card.182 After sharing this information with a police dispatcher, the officer was informed “that Strieff
had an outstanding arrest warrant for a traffic violation.”183 Thereafter,
Strieff was arrested.184 A subsequent search incident to Strieff’s arrest
uncovered illegal narcotics and other incriminating items.185 He was subsequently indicted on drug charges.186
Strieff unsuccessfully argued that the evidence seized during the search
should be suppressed since it was the product of an unlawful detainment.187 The government conceded that the stop could not be justified on
Fourth Amendment grounds.188 However, the state contended that the
“arrest warrant attenuated the connection between the unlawful stop and
the discovery of the contraband.”189 The trial court accepted this argument and denied the defendant’s motion.190 The case was affirmed on
appeal, but was reversed by the Utah Supreme Court.191
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the seized evidence should
not be suppressed given that the warrant attenuated the seized evidence
from the unconstitutional seizure.192 The Court summarily addressed and
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016).
Id. at 2059.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2060.
Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2060.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2060.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2063.
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rejected a conclusion of the Utah Supreme Court that the attenuation
doctrine193 applies “only ‘to circumstances involving an independent act
of a defendant’s “free will” in confessing to a crime or consenting to a
search.’”194 The Court, noting the defendant’s apparent concession of
this issue, stated that the “logic” of its prior precedents involving the attenuation principle does not restrict itself to free will acts of the
defendant.195
The Court then assessed whether the report of the arrest warrant constituted a valid attenuating circumstance. It made this assessment by reviewing three factors identified in Brown v. Illinois: “temporal proximity”
between the constitutional breach and the recovered evidence, “the presence of intervening circumstances,” and “the purpose and flagrancy of
the official misconduct.”196 As for temporal proximity, the Court, citing
Brown, concluded that this factor favored suppression given that the defendant’s unconstitutional detainment and the recovery of the evidence
were separated by only a few minutes.197 The majority found that the
second factor—intervening circumstances—”strongly favor[ed]” the government.198 It reasoned that the existence of a valid arrest warrant predated, and was unrelated to, the incident involving Strieff.199 Upon
learning of the warrant, the Court stated that the officer had an obligation to effectuate an arrest and that the search of Strieff’s person was a
lawful search incident to arrest.200
With respect to the third factor—”the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct”—the Court concluded that this factor also “strongly
favor[ed] the” government.201 The Court reasoned that two errors committed by the officer—not knowing how long Strieff had been in the
apartment prior to his detainment, and not asking Strieff whether he
would agree to talk as opposed to “demanding” that he talk—were “negligent” mistakes.202 And it added that there was nothing in the record to
193. The Court noted that the attenuation doctrine is one of three exceptions to the
exclusionary rule that involve direct linkages between the constitutional violation and the
evidence seized. Id. at 2061. The other two are the independent source doctrine and the
inevitable discovery rule. The former “allows trial courts to admit evidence obtained in an
unlawful search if officers independently acquired it from a separate, independent source.”
Id. (citation omitted). And the latter “allows for the admission of evidence that would have
been discovered even without the unconstitutional source.” Id. (citation omitted).
194. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2061.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 2061–63 (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603–04 (1975)). Professor
Kerr argues that the majority “presents the Brown three-factor test as if it were obviously
the settled doctrine a court should apply. It’s worth noting that this is hardly so.” Orin
Kerr, Opinion Analysis: The Exclusionary Rule Is Weakened but It Still Lives, SCOTUSBLOG (June 20, 2016), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/opinion-analysis-the-exclusionary-rule-is-weakened-but-it-still-lives/ [https://perma.cc/SYR7-VKEC].
197. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2062. (noting that, in Brown, the illegal arrest and evidence
recovery were separated by “less than two hours”).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 2062–63.
201. Id. at 2063.
202. Id.

2017]

Wrong Decision at The Wrong Time

315

suggest that this practice was a “systemic or recurrent” issue.203 The
Court rejected Strieff’s argument that the officer’s actions were purposeful because the officer stopped him for the sole reason of attempting
to gather evidence.204 It reasoned that the officer’s decision to stop Strieff
was based upon his legitimate suspicion about narcotics activity within
the house.205 Thus, the Court concluded that the detainment of Strieff
was not a “suspicionless fishing expedition.”206
The Court also rejected Strieff’s argument that a decision not to apply
the exclusionary doctrine would encourage “dragnet searches” given the
voluminous existence of outstanding warrants.207 The Court disagreed,
setting forth two responses.208 First, the Court explained that such practices would expose an officer to civil liability.209 Second, it stated that the
third Brown factor (the flagrancy of the officer’s conduct) accounts for
this practice.210 Had such evidence been presented, the Court commented, the outcome of the case might have been different.211
In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor stated that Strieff authorizes the police to detain an individual without suspicion, demand identification, arrest and search that person in the event that there is an outstanding
warrant, have the constitutional infraction excused, and have the evidence admitted at a subsequent criminal trial.212 She strenuously disputed
the majority’s arguments regarding the second and third Brown factors.213 Given the existence of more than 180,000 misdemeanor warrants
in Utah, Sotomayor maintained that the officer’s actions “[were] not
some intervening surprise,” but “[were] ‘calculated’ to procure . . . evidence.”214 She added that “nothing about this case is isolated.”215 Rather,
she insisted, that the police often exploit the commonality of warrants
(“over 7.8 million outstanding warrants,” mostly for minor offenses) and
203. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2063.
204. Id. at 2064.
205. Id. at 2063.
206. Id. at 2064.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2064.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Justice Kagan also wrote a dissent in which she
argued, inter alia, that the majority’s “misapplication” of the Brown factors creates incentives for the police to perform unconstitutional stops. Id. at 2073 (Kagen, J., dissenting).
She stated:
Now the officer knows that the stop may well yield admissible evidence: So
long as the target is one of the many millions of people in this country with
an outstanding arrest warrant, anything the officer finds in a search is fair
game for use in a criminal prosecution. The officer’s incentive to violate the
Constitution thus increases: From here on, he sees potential advantage in
stopping individuals without reasonable suspicion—exactly the temptation
the exclusionary rule is supposed to remove. Id. at 2074.
213. Id. at 2066–67 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
214. Id. at 2066.
215. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2068.
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stop individuals in order to perform a warrant check.216
III. EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND STANDING
DOCTRINE REFORM
The causes of aggressive policing, and the proffered solutions, are numerous and varied. For example, Professor Rachel Harmon, noting the
limited potential of existing federal remedies to inspire police reform, argues that “federal actors may foster reform by lowering the costs of
adopting policies that prevent misconduct and by shoring up rewards for
police chiefs and departments that pursue reform.”217 Second Circuit
Judge Jon A. Newman contends that aggressive policing can be curbed by
amending 42 U.S.C. 1983,218 including the qualified immunity enjoyed by
officers.219 Professor Samuel Walker has proposed a statute that parallels
Section 14141 of the 1994 Violent Crime Control Act which empowers
the Justice Department to pursue civil remedies against municipalities
that engage in a pattern or practice of civil rights deprivations.220 His
suggested statute would empower state attorney generals to bring civil
suits analogous to those brought by the Department of Justice.221 Professor Jeffery Fagan argues that the New York Police Department’s aggressive stop and frisk tactics were characterized less by a broken windows
approach to policing, than by factors such as race and poverty.222 He sug216. Id. (referencing the Department of Justice’s Ferguson Report, Sotomayor observed that, “In the St. Louis metropolitan area, officers ‘routinely’ stop people—on the
street, at bus stops, or even in court—for no reason other than ‘an officer’s desire to check
whether the subject had a municipal arrest warrant pending.’”).
217. Rachel Harmon, Limited Leverage: Federal Remedies and Policing Reform, 32 ST.
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 33, 34 (2012).
218. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act
or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not
be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was
unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable
exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of
the District of Columbia.
219. Jon O. Newman, Here’s a Better Way to Punish the Police: Sue Them for Money,
WASHINGTON POST (June 23, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/heres-abetter-way-to-punish-the-police-sue-them-for-money/2016/06/23/c0608ad4-3959-11e6-9ccdd6005beac8b3_story.html [https://perma.cc/T8PS-JMA9].
220. Samuel Walker & Morgan Macdonald, An Alternative Remedy for Police Misconduct: A Model State “Pattern or Practice” Statute, 19 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 479, 481–82
(2009).
221. Id.
222. Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and
Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 463–64 (2000) (“We find little
evidence to support claims that policing targeted places and signs of physical disorder, and
show instead that stops of citizens were more often concentrated in minority neighborhoods characterized by poverty and social disadvantage.”).
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gests that reform must include an infusion of community social norms
into police organizational culture.223
In addition, the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, established by President Obama in May 2015, was charged with the task of
examining the problems associated with aggressive policing and prescribing remedial measures.224 In their Final Report, the Task Force identified
an array of underlying causes and made over fifty recommendations.225
The report called for, among other things, more effectual officer training,
greater transparency in regards to police department policies, and greater
community involvement in public safety matters.226 It also recommended
that officers approach their service with a “guardian mindset,” and that
police departments develop policies that clarify what is considered reasonable and unreasonable force and that discourage unnecessary
aggression.227
Parts I and II of this article have detailed how Supreme Court jurisprudence, primarily since the close of the Warren Court, has steadily
strengthened the investigative arm of the police and weakened Fourth
Amendment protections. This protracted period of favorable law enforcement decisions carries predictable implications. It is safe to say that decades of rulings that diminish Fourth Amendment protections certainly
do nothing to promote police organizational respect for such safeguards.
Rather, it has had the opposite effect. The steady drumbeat of Court rulings favorable to law enforcement interests have the obvious effect of
encouraging officers to take advantage of the freedoms that the Court has
previously granted. This encouragement is particularly evident in the
Court’s exclusionary and standing rule jurisprudence, with Strieff representing the latest entry in this digression.
When the Court, over the course of several decades, renders decisions
which communicate, inter alia, that the police enjoy wide investigative
223. Id. at 502–03 (“How information is shared with community stakeholders, whether
the agenda for analysis is shared with these groups, and how the findings of data analyses
are translated into concrete measures for organizational change are part of a process of
community participation that can ‘civilize’ the police workplace through transparency,
leading to democratic interactions focused on data-driven facts. The extent to which opportunities for community interaction with police are routinized and institutionalized can
break down the insularity of police social norms at the top and bottom of its hierarchy.”
(footnote omitted)). For additional academic recommendations, see also Jonathan Blanks,
Thin Blue Lies: How Pretextual Stops Undermine Police Legitimacy, 66 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 931, 946 (2016) (arguing for termination or near-termination of pretextual stops);
Tonja Jacobi, The Law and Economics of the Exclusionary Rule, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
585, 610, 675 (2011) (proposing an approach that differentiates between guilty and innocent defendants at the screening stage); Kami Chavis Simmons, Future of the Fourth
Amendment: The Problem with Privacy, Poverty and Policing, 14 U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIGION GENDER & CLASS 240, 267–68 (2014) (arguing for the adoption of a series of federal
and state legislative responses to strengthen individual Fourth Amendment safeguards).
224. Exec. Order No. 13684, 3 C.F.R. § 312 (2014).
225. President’s Task Force On 21st Century Policing, Final Report of the President’s
Task Force on 21st Century Policing, at 69–99 (2015).
226. Id. at 13, 41–42, 53.
227. Id. at 11, 20–21.
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authority and that their constitutional missteps will frequently be overlooked, the impact on police organizational culture and officer behavior
is fairly clear. It is foolhardy to think that police organizations will voluntarily refrain from exercising the investigative authority which they have
been granted.228 And it should surprise no one when the police, during
the course of such investigations, exhibit a disregard for individual constitutional protections given that the Court has encouraged them to do so.
Furthermore, it is plainly foreseeable that some of these officers who
cross constitutional lines will get too aggressive, and that some of these
encounters will become unnecessarily deadly.229 With little to fear in
terms of criminal or civil sanctions,230 internal discipline,231 or suppression of evidence, the aggressive policing that has been so prevalent of late
will only continue.
As Justices Kagan and Sotomayor noted, the majority in Strieff sent a
signal to the police that they can stop individuals without cause and check
for the existence of a warrant.232 If there is a warrant and that warrant is
outstanding, then this event will dissipate the taint from the original constitutional infraction.233 Strieff grants officers yet another investigative
freedom and further weakens individual protections under the Fourth
Amendment. But the most distressing aspect of Strieff is not that it encourages officers to breach constitutional safeguards, but rather, that it
encourages them to do so in the context of a physical intervention. With
the plethora of media reports depicting nationwide aggressive police
practices, senseless deaths of African-Americans, and growing community distrust and resentment, Strieff was remarkably ill-timed.234
228. See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 610 n.2 (2004) (“Emphasizing the impeachment exception to the Miranda rule . . . some [police] training programs advise officers to
omit Miranda warnings altogether or to continue questioning after the suspect invokes his
rights.”); U.S. v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 733, 735 (1980) (holding that evidence recovered as
a byproduct of deliberate unconstitutional search of a third-party’s privacy interests was
nevertheless admissible against the defendant who lacked standing to object to the search).
229. Julian A. Cook III, Police Reform and the Judicial Mandate, 50 GA. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 5 (2016) (noting that police departments will naturally take advantage of the freedoms allowed by the Supreme Court and that it is predictable that officers will cross
constitutional boundaries).
230. Harmon, supra note 217 at 37, 52–53; see also Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453, 466–67 (2004) (noting
the infrequency of criminal prosecutions under § 242 as well as the various hurdles associated with instituting cases pursuant to this section); Larry Glasser, The American Exclusionary Rule Debate: Looking to England and Canada for Guidance, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L
L. REV. 159, 191 (2003) (noting the infrequency of § 1983 and Bivens actions that produce
successful outcomes); John Rappaport, Second-Order Regulation of Law Enforcement, 103
CAL. L. REV. 205, 239 n.191 (2015) (noting that “civil-damages suits are often ineffective
due to qualified immunity, indemnification, and organizational culture” and that criminal
actions are “rare and difficult to sustain”).
231. See Armacost, supra note 230 at 493–514 (stating that police department culture
often encourages unconstitutional and aggressive police practices).
232. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2064, 2073 (2016).
233. Id.
234. Professor Sherry Colb expressed reservations regarding the following dicta that
appeared in the majority opinion in Strieff: “because we ultimately conclude that the warrant breaks the causal chain, we also have no need to decide whether the warrant’s existence
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It has been argued by many that the exclusionary rule has not effectively curbed police behavior.235 But, as this article makes clear, the exclusionary rule has hardly been given a chance to succeed. Though the
principle decline in the exclusionary rule commenced after the close of
the Warren Court in 1969, the actual curtailment of the rule commenced
only two years after Mapp in Wong Sun in 1963. Wong Sun introduced
the attenuated circumstances exception, and Hudson and Strieff have further expanded the reach of that doctrine. Similarly, the attendant standing principle was largely stripped of its scope during the post-Warren
Court years. But the process actually began with Simmons in 1968. And
shortly thereafter, in 1978 and 1980, with the Court’s decisions in Rakas
and Salvucci, the expanded bases for standing enunciated in Jones had
been officially eradicated, leaving the narrow personal privacy test as the
principal avenue to challenge unlawful police conduct. With a primary
standing test that restricts court access to those who can demonstrate a
personal privacy interest in the area of the search, the Court effectively
limited the reach of the exclusionary rule within twenty years of Mapp. It
is difficult to meaningfully assess the impact of the exclusionary rule on
police behavior when the exclusionary rule has rarely been operational at
anything close to full capacity.
I’ve argued elsewhere, and reiterate here, that a reinvigoration of the
exclusionary rule and a robust standing doctrine are a sound and logical
aspect of any long-term police organization reform.236 Certainly the answer to aggressive policing requires a multi-pronged strategy, and I do
alone would make the initial stop constitutional even if Officer Fackrell was unaware of its
existence.” Sherry F. Colb, A Potential Landmine in Waiting in Utah v. Strieff, JUSTIA:
VERDICT (June 28, 2016), https://verdict.justia.com/2016/06/28/potential-landmine-waitingutah-v-strieff [https://perma.cc/C95F-M3SD]. She commented that, should the Court eventually conclude that an outstanding warrant cures the absence of reasonable suspicion on
the part of an officer, it would amount to “open season” on individuals given the abundance of outstanding warrants in existence. Id. She concluded that “[i]t is far safer, for the
public in need of protection from police overreach, for police to act prospectively on the
basis of what they have reason to think and what they know regarding a suspect.” Id. (first
emphasis added).
235. See Tonja Jacobi, The Law and Economics of the Exclusionary Rule, 87 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 585, 610, 675 (2011) (arguing that the exclusionary rule does not deter
police misconduct against minority communities); Yale Kamisar, The Writings of John
Barker Waite and Thomas Davies on the Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule, 100 MICH.
L. REV. 1821, 1821 (2002) (reviewing the arguments of Waite and others who opposed the
exclusionary penalty); William T. Pizzi, The Need to Overrule Mapp v. Ohio, 82 U. COLO.
L. REV. 679, 685 (2011) (arguing “that the Court needs to rethink what it did in Mapp
because, well intentioned as the exclusionary rule was and appropriate as it may have
seemed nearly fifty years ago, the rule is based on an assumption which has proven dangerous over the years, namely, the belief that harsh mandatory punishments will deter undesirable social behaviors”); Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the
Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 365 (1999) (arguing that “[t]he exclusionary
rule is significantly flawed as a deterrent device”); Comment, Rethinking the Good Faith
Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1610, 1630 (1982) (noting that
“there is very little empirical ‘proof’ that the exclusionary rule in fact deters police conduct
through [various] institutional mechanisms . . . or through any other method”).
236. Julian A. Cook III, Police Culture in the Twenty-First Century: A Critique of the
President’s Task Force’s Final Report, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 106, 112–14
(2016); Julian A. Cook III, Policing in the Era of Permissiveness: Mitigating Aggressive
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not suggest that this article’s proffered remedial approach is a panacea.
Yet, if sustained reform is to take hold, a sustained judicial mandate must
be part of the equation. When police organizations are cognizant that
negative consequences will accompany their misdeeds, their culture will
necessarily adjust. Thus, if law enforcement entities are aware that any
evidence obtained by virtue of a constitutional breach will be excluded,
these organizations will be motivated to adjust their cultures accordingly.
Certainly, this will require an abandonment of those exceptions to the
exclusionary rule where there is a direct linkage between the constitutional infraction and the derivative evidence. The attenuated circumstances, good faith, and inevitable discovery exceptions are the three
exemptions that fit this paradigm.
However, an exclusionary rule, no matter how well reinforced, is a
largely empty remedy if the class of individuals eligible to enforce it is
insubstantial. Indeed, this winnowed standing landscape has been in effect since Jones was reversed in 1980, which was four years prior to the
Court’s announcement of the most significant exception to the exclusionary rule—the good faith exception—in Leon. Today, a demonstration of a
privacy interest in the area of the search is the primary standing threshold
and there is no recognition of third-party standing. Cognizant of this fact,
there is little, if anything, that deters an officer from performing an illegal
detention or search of a third-party. In fact, the incentives are precisely
the opposite.
Recent evidence of this fact is contained in the Department of Justice’s
scathing report in August 2016 of its investigation of the Baltimore Police
Department.237 The report concluded that there was reasonable cause to
believe that the Baltimore Police Department engaged in a pattern or
practice of unconstitutional practices.238 Specifically, it found, inter alia,
that the police routinely made “unconstitutional stops, searches, and arrests,” that this practice disproportionately and “unjustifi[ably]” impacted
the African-American community, and that it “us[ed] excessive force.”239
With respect to searches and seizures, the report found that the practice
of stopping individuals in the absence of reasonable suspicion was “widespread” and that such practices were often the result of directives from
supervisors within the police department.240 Citing Strieff’s conclusion
that the investigative stop in that case was the product of negligence and
was not part of a systemic problem, the Justice Department stated that its
findings contradicted that conclusion. The Justice Department found that
many officers in the Baltimore Police Department who unconstitutionally
Police Conduct Through Third-Party Standing, 81 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1121, 1153–65
(2016).
237. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., Investigation of the Baltimore Police Department, (Aug. 10, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/883366/download [https://perma
.cc/W3V9-ERV7].
238. Id. at 3.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 27–28.
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stopped individuals were motivated by a desire to ascertain whether the
detained individual had an outstanding warrant.241
To reverse this incentive, this article argues that in addition to the
aforementioned exclusionary rule doctrinal reforms, the landscape of eligible challengers to police conduct must be greatly expanded. This article
calls for a due process based third-party standing doctrine that reaches
beyond the contours enunciated in Jones.242 Standing should extend to
criminal defendants, irrespective of their privacy interest in the area of
the search, their status as a target, their legitimate presence in the area of
the search, or their possessory interest in the items seized. More specifically, the proposal recommends that third-parties be allowed to challenge
government conduct to the same extent as the individual who was personally aggrieved by the state’s actions. Though he was not directly commenting upon the propriety of third-party standing, the comments of
Professor Scott Sundby regarding the exclusionary rule are nevertheless
instructive. He states, “the constitutional rights that constrain government actors and that protect its citizens from constitutional transgressions
mean little if the everyday person has no way of raising them in forums to
which they have ready and full access. And in this regard, the exclusionary rule plays a particularly critical role.”243 His poignant comments reflect certain realities. First, the exclusionary rule serves as a vital check
upon the actions of government actors. Second, this check is of miniscule
value absent meaningful access to the courts by “everyday” individuals.
The dual proposals called for in this article—a revitalized exclusionary
rule doctrine and broad third-party access to the courts—recognize and
further these core concerns.
In the criminal litigation context, third-party standing is already recognized in the jury selection context. In a line of cases starting with Batson
v. Kentucky, which held that an African-American defendant could challenge the exclusion from jury service of another black potential juror,244
and Powers v. Ohio, which allowed a white juror, on equal protection
grounds, to challenge the government’s exclusion of potential black jurors,245 the Court has recognized the necessity for third-party standing.246
In reaching these conclusions, the Court relied heavily upon a judicial
integrity rationale—the very rationale abandoned by the Court in the exclusionary rule context in the post-Warren Court era. In Powers, the
241. Id. at 28 (“Many of the unlawful stops we identified appear motivated at least in
part by officers’ desire to check whether the stopped individuals have outstanding warrants
that would allow officers to make an arrest or search individuals in hopes of finding illegal
firearms or narcotics.”).
242. See Nadia B. Soree, Whose Fourth Amendment and Does It Matter? A Due Process
Approach to Fourth Amendment Standing, 46 IND. L. REV. 753 (2013).
243. Scott Sundby, Everyman’s Exclusionary Rule: The Exclusionary Rule and the Rule
of Law (or Why Conservatives Should Embrace the Exclusionary Rule), 394 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 393, 405 (2013) (emphasis added).
244. 476 U.S. 79, 83–85 (1986).
245. 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991).
246. Id. at 423 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Court made several observations to this effect. It noted that “racial discrimination in the selection of jurors ‘casts doubt on the integrity of the
judicial process,’ and places the fairness of a criminal proceeding in
doubt.”247 Noting the role of the jury as a “check” against abusive government power, the Court stated that a jury selection process that is
tainted by a discriminatory “process damages both the fact and the perception of this guarantee,” and that a judiciary that stands idly by while a
prosecutor “[a]ctive[ly] discriminat[es] . . . condones violations of the
United States Constitution within the very institution entrusted with its
enforcement, and so invites cynicism respecting the jury’s neutrality and
its obligation to adhere to the law.”248 It added that the rationale that
underlies “the jury system is to impress upon the criminal defendant and
the community as a whole that a verdict of conviction or acquittal is given
in accordance with the law by persons who are fair.”249
These same concerns apply in the standing and exclusionary rule contexts. The integrity of the criminal process is tainted when illegally obtained evidence is admitted. As in Powers, the Court in Mapp expressed
similar sentiments regarding the critical need to ensure an adjudicative
process untainted by compromising behaviors.250 While it noted Justice
Cardozo’s concern that the exclusionary rule allows a “criminal . . . to go
free because the constable has blundered,” the Court responded that
there is another, more significant factor to consider—”the imperative of
judicial integrity.”251 The Court stated, “[t]he criminal goes free, if he
must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its
disregard of the charter of its own existence.”252
A trial court’s receipt of evidence obtained by unconstitutional
processes implicates the same concerns identified by the Court in the context of racial discrimination in jury selection. However, police reform that
is largely dependent upon individual and organizational goodwill is highly
unlikely to culminate in sustained improvements, particularly on a national level. Lasting and positive police reform will be difficult to achieve
absent a vast landscape of eligible challengers, a reinvigorated exclusionary rule, and the persistent threat of judicial sanction. When officers, as
well as the organizations for which they work, understand that negative
consequences will append to their misdeeds, then meaningful and lasting
changes in the culture of policing are more likely to occur. The following
consent decree experiences are informative.
In 1996, the Department of Justice commenced an investigation of the
Pittsburgh Police Department to investigate allegations of police miscon247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

Id. at 411 (majority opinion) (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 556 (1979)).
Id. at 411–12.
Id. at 413.
See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Id. at 659.
Id.
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duct. It was the first case253 under a federal law that authorizes the Justice Department to bring a civil action against a government entity that
“engage[s] in a pattern or practice” of violating individual protections
guaranteed by the constitution.254 The following year, the Justice Department and the City of Pittsburgh entered into a consent decree, which is a
settlement that outlines the parameters that the City must satisfy, is enforceable by a court, and will persist until such time as the settlement
terms are complied with.255 Typically, there is a federal monitor, paid for
by the municipality, who oversees the city’s progress and prepares periodic reports. The decree required that the Pittsburgh police “make comprehensive changes in oversight, training, and supervision of officers,”
and “develop a computerized early-warning system to track individual officers’ behavior; document uses of force, traffic stops, and searches; and
provide annual training in cultural diversity, integrity and ethics.”256
The decree ended five years after it was implemented.257 According to
the Vera Institute of Justice, who prepared an extensive report reviewing
the impact of the decree,258 there were many positive developments, as
well as some developments that were left wanting.259 Nevertheless, after
the decree ended, high-profile incidents of police aggression260 and
“cronyism” within the police department led to public speculation on the
part of the city’s mayor, Bill Peduto, that a second consent decree might
253. Robert C. Davis, Christopher W. Ortiz, Nicole J. Henderson, Joel Miller &
Michelle K. Massie, Turning Necessity into Virtue: Pittsburgh’s Experience with a Federal
Consent Decree, VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE (Sept. 2002), http://archive.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/Pittsburgh_consent_decree.pdf [https://perma.cc/X5BKF3RU].
254. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2012) provides:
(a) Unlawful conduct. It shall be unlawful for any governmental authority, or
any agent thereof, or any person acting on behalf of a governmental authority, to engage in a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers
or by officials or employees of any governmental agency with responsibility
for the administration of juvenile justice or the incarceration of juveniles that
deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by
the Constitution or laws of the United States. (b) Civil action by Attorney
General. Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe
that a violation of paragraph (1) . . . has occurred, the Attorney General, for
or in the name of the United States, may in a civil action obtain appropriate
equitable and declaratory relief to eliminate the pattern or practice.
255. Stephen Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation in American Police Departments, 99
MINN. L. REV. 1343, 1347 n.13 (2015).
256. Davis, Ortiz, Henderson, Miller & Massie, supra note 253, at 8.
257. Id. at 47.
258. The report was supported by the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services,
U.S. Department of Justice. See id. at ii.
259. Id. at 62–66 (noting various positive lessons, such as the critical roles of the police
chief, the city and the monitor in achieving success, as well as areas in need of improvement, such as skepticism among community members regarding the extent of change
within police organizations).
260. A “Pattern or Practice” of Violence in America, BLOOMBERG (MAY 27, 2015),
http://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2015-doj-and-police-violence/?cmpid=yhoo&ref=yfp
[https://perma.cc/3AZQ-UDFC] (noting that a violent beating of a high school student
who was unarmed garnered headlines, and that former police chief, Nate Harper, was serving time in prison for fraudulent conduct).
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be forthcoming.261
In 2004, the City of Cleveland entered into a one-year agreement with
the Department of Justice requiring that the Cleveland Police Department implement certain reforms pertaining to the department’s use of
force.262 However, there was neither judicial oversight of the reform process nor a federal monitor.263 Rather, the police served as its own overseer.264 At least partially due to this lack of judicial oversight, problems
persisted which brought about a second Justice Department investigation.265 That investigation culminated in an investigative report issued by
the Justice Department in December 2015, and a second consent decree
in May 2015 between Cleveland and the Department of Justice. The Justice Department concluded in its investigative report that it had
reasonable cause to believe that [the Cleveland Police Department]
engages in a pattern or practice of the use of excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment . . . and have determined that structural and systemic deficiencies and practices—including insufficient
accountability, inadequate training, ineffective policies, and inadequate engagement with the community—contribute to the use of unreasonable force.266
Pursuant to the consent decree, the parties agreed that the police division would “provide clear guidance to officers; increase accountability;
provide for civilian participation in and oversight of the police; provide
officers with needed support, training, and equipment; and increase
transparency.”267
261. Jeffrey Benzing, Pittsburgh Police Could Face Second Federal Consent Decree,
Peduto Says, NEW PITTSBURGH COURIER ONLINE (July 10, 2014), http://newpittsburghcourieronline.com/2014/07/10/pittsburgh-police-could-face-second-federal-consentdecree-peduto-says/ [https://perma.cc/6YJD-Z2AK] (noting the Mayor’s claim that many
officers “don’t realize how close we are to going into another consent decree”).
262. Ken Hare, How the Justice Department Has Handled Other Police Consent Decrees, CHICAGODEFENDER.COM (Apr. 6, 2016), http://chicagodefender.com/2016/04/06/
how-the-justice-department-has-handled-other-police-consent-decrees/ [https://perma.cc/
F4VB-6TKK]; See also U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., AGREEMENT TO CONCLUDE DOJ’S INVESTIGATION OF THE CLEVELAND DIVISION OF POLICE’S USE OF DEADLY
FORCE, (Feb. 9, 2004) (noting that the “use of deadly force” precipitated the agreement
with the Cleveland Police Department).
263. Hare, supra note 262. See also Sarah Childress, Cleveland’s Second Chance at Police Reform, PBS (May 25, 2015), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/clevelands-second-chance-at-police-reform/ [https://perma.cc/7YGZ-HRLB] (“The deal wasn’t meant to
bring structural change. It imposed no federal monitor to hold the department accountable, and there was little community involvement.”).
264. Hare, supra note 262.
265. Id. See also Childress, supra note 263 (noting that within “the last two decades,
Cleveland’s police department is one of only five law enforcement agencies that has been
subject to two separate federal investigations”).
266. U.S. ATTY’S OFFICE, N.D. OF OHIO, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CIVIL RIGHTS DIV.,
INVESTIGATION OF THE CLEVELAND POLICE DEP’T at 1 (2014), https://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2014/12/04/cleveland_division_of_police_
findings_letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/97GP-WPKX].
267. Settlement Agreement at 1, United States v. City of Cleveland, No. 1:15-cv-01046SO (N.D. Ohio May 26, 2015) (“The Constitution requires the City to prevent excessive
force, to ensure that searches and seizures are reasonable, and to ensure that police ser-
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The Justice Department cited the absence of judicial oversight in the
2004 agreement as a critical reason why that agreement failed. It noted
that Cleveland initially abided by the agreement, which resulted in its
termination in 2005. However, over time the city failed to enact other
agreed upon measures or failed to maintain those measures that had been
implemented. The Justice Department stated:
In 2002, we provided initial observations regarding CDP’s use of
force and accountability systems and, in 2004, we recommended that
the Division make changes to address some of the deficiencies we
identified. CDP entered into an agreement with us, but that agreement was not enforced by a court and did not involve an independent monitor to assess its implementation. . . . In 2005, we found that
Cleveland had abided by that agreement and it was terminated. It is
clear, however, that despite these measures, many of the policy and
practice reforms that were initiated in response to our 2004 memorandum agreement were either not fully implemented or, if implemented, were not maintained over time. It is critical that the City
and the Division now take more rigorous measures to identify, address, and prevent excessive force to protect the public and to build
the community’s trust. We believe that a consent decree and an independent monitor are necessary to ensure that reforms are successfully implemented and sustainable.268
The Pittsburgh and Cleveland examples highlight why judicial oversight, among other influences and reform measures, is essential to the
successful implementation and sustenance of police reform measures.
Admittedly, some police departments will, and have to date, maintained
successful reforms.269 However, the critical inquiry is whether such measures, when implemented, will be preserved over the long term and
whether such reforms can take hold on a national scale. As Professor
Samuel Walker commented, “[s]erious questions remain about whether
reforms effected through litigation will be sustained once the consent decree or [memoranda of agreement] is terminated.”270 This article submits
that persistent judicial oversight, accompanied by a reinvigorated exclusionary rule and an expanded standing landscape, are central to sustained
and widespread police reform.
vices are delivered free from bias. These precepts also are fundamental to a strong community-police relationship. To further these goals, the City has agreed to provide clear
guidance to officers; increase accountability; provide for civilian participation in and oversight of the police; provide officers with needed support, training, and equipment; and
increase transparency.”); Hare, supra note 262.
268. Settlement Agreement, supra note 267 at 5.
269. The DOJ and the Consent Decree—Will It Change Bad Policing?, SCPR.COM:
TAKE TWO (Aug. 11, 2016), http://www.scpr.org/programs/take-two/2016/08/11/51208/thedoj-and-the-consent-decree-will-it-change-bad/ [https://perma.cc/5KA7-3MNK] (noting
Professor Samuel Walker’s comment that some cities, such as Los Angeles, have emerged
from their consent decrees with reforms that, to date, have been sustained).
270. Samuel Walker & Morgan Macdonald, An Alternative Remedy for Police Misconduct: A Model State “Pattern or Practice” Statute, 19 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 479,
481 (2009).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Strieff generated substantial media commentary. It was referred to as “blistering,”271 was noted for its “extraordinary . . . breadth and intensity,”272 and was recognized for its “brutal and
necessary indictment” of the conservative majority.273 Her dissent expressed the sentiments of many, particularly those in minority communities, who feel that the criminal justice system is characterized by
inequities. In her final paragraph she commented that the “countless people who are routinely targeted by [the] police . . . are the canaries in the
coal mine whose deaths . . . warn us that no one can breathe in this atmosphere.”274 And she concludes with these words: “Until their voices matter
too, our justice system will continue to be anything but.”275
Within the umbrella of her comments, though not directly referenced,
is Strieff’s place in the ongoing dialogue about aggressive policing.
Strieff’s encouragement of unconstitutional policing in the context of
physical encounters is poorly reasoned and ill-timed. But when viewed in
the greater context of the Court’s exclusionary rule history, it is the latest
entry in a persistent digression of individual liberties that has lasted several decades. As claimant access to the courts has lessened, and the exclusionary mandate has been weakened, the investigative authority of the
police has necessarily been enhanced. And until there is a meaningful
reversal of this trend, significant and lasting police reforms will have substantial hurdles to overcome.

271. Robert Barnes, Sotomayor’s Fierce Dissent Slams High Court’s Ruling on Evidence
from Illegal Stops, WASH. POST (June 20, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
courts_law/supreme-court-rules-5-3-that-mistakes-by-officer-dont-undermine-conviction/
2016/06/20/f1f7d0d2-36f9-11e6-8f7c-d4c723a2becb_story.html [https://perma.cc/G6DAHV6P].
272. Matt Ford, Justice Sotomayor’s Ringing Dissent, THE ATLANTIC (June 20, 2016),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/utah-streiff-sotomayor/487922/ [https://
perma.cc/JL7H-NZ9K].
273. Mark Joseph Stern, Read Sonia Sotomayor’s Atomic Bomb of a Dissent Slamming
Racial Profiling and Mass Imprisonment, SLATE.COM: THE SLATEST (June 20, 2016), http://
www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2016/06/20/sonia_sotomayor_dissent_in_utah_v_strieff_
takes_on_police_misconduct.html [https://perma.cc/WDJ6-XWH2].
274. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2071 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
275. Id.

